

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 030351  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY EUR/CE:DANDERSON:SLU  
APPROVED BY S - MR. TARNOFF  
EUR - MR. HARTMAN  
S/S - MR. SEBASTIAN

-----101801Z 127184 /53

O 101623Z FEB 77  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA IMMEDIATE  
USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 030351

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGSPFOR, GW, XF, MNUC, SF

SUBJECT: FRG AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON THE SECRETARY

, SUMMARY. FRG AMBASSADOR VON STADEN CALLED ON  
SECRETARY VANCE ON FEBRUARY 9. SUBJECTS DISCUSSED WERE:  
THE MIDDLE EAST, MBFR, CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES, CIEC/  
ECONOMIC SUMMIT, CYPRUS, NON-PROLIFERATION, SOUTHERN  
AFRICA AND UPCOMING FRG VISITORS TO WASHINGTON. OF  
PARTICULAR NOTE WAS: THE SECRETARY'S OFFER TO MEET WITH  
GENSCHER AFTER HIS (THE SECRETARY'S) VISIT TO MOSCOW;  
THE SECRETARY'S AGREEMENT TO HAVE US-FRG BILATERALS IN  
WASHINGTON ON MBFR IN MARCH; AND THE FRG-FRENCH PUSH

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 030351

TO HAVE THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT TAKE PLACE ON MAY 8 OR SO  
BEFORE REPEAT BEFORE THE CIEC MINISTERIAL. END SUMMARY.

2. AMBASSADOR VON STADEN SAID THAT HE WISHED TO RAISE  
SEVERAL POINTS ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM FOREIGN MINISTER  
GENSCHER, WHO LOOKED FORWARD TO SEEING THE SECRETARY AS  
EARLY AS WAS CONVENIENT. GENSCHER HOPED THAT THIS MIGHT  
BE AFTER THE SECRETARY'S MIDDLE EAST OR MOSCOW TRIP.  
THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE WOULD UNFORTUNATELY NOT BE

ABLE TO SEE GENSCHER AFTER THE MIDDLE EAST VISIT BUT LOOKED FORWARD TO MEETING WITH HIM EN ROUTE BACK TO THE UNITED STATES FROM MOSCOW.

3. MIDDLE EAST. AMBASSADOR VON STADEN NOTED THAT GENSCHER HAD BEGUN HIS TRIP TO DAMASCUS, AMMAN AND CAIRO. HE SAID THAT GENSCHER REGRETTED NOT HAVING BEEN ABLE TO INCLUDE BEIRUT ON HIS ITINERARY, AS UNDER SECRETARY HABIB HAD EARLIER SUGGESTED, AND SAID THAT GENSCHER WAS SIMPLY UNABLE TO DO SO FOR TECHNICAL REASONS. VON STADEN SAID THAT GENSCHER HOPED TO IMPRESS UPON THE THREE ARAB GOVERNMENTS THAT THEY SHOULD ATTEMPT TO HAVE THE PLO ALIGN ITSELF WITH THEMSELVES POLITICALLY: GENSCHER SAW NO PROSPECT FOR PROGRESS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITHOUT SUCH MOVEMENT. GENSCHER FELT THAT A UNIFIED ARAB DELEGATION COULD LEAD TO A COMPROMISE ON THE INCLUSION OF THE PLO IN THE GENEVA TALKS. ALSO, IF THE PLO COULD BE BROUGHT TO ACCEPT A PALESTINIAN STATE ON THE WEST BANK, GENSCHER FELT THIS WOULD REPRESENT THE PALESTINIANS' DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE ISRAELI STATE.

4. THE SECRETARY SAID HE GENERALLY SHARED THESE VIEWS, AND ALSO CONSIDERED IT ESSENTIAL TO HAVE THE PLO ALIGN ITSELF WITH THE MODERATE ARAB STATES. HE EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR MINISTER GENSCHER'S READINESS TO BE HELPFUL IN THE MIDDLE EAST. VON STADEN SAID HE WISHED

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 030351

TO ADD ONE FURTHER POINT, WHICH WAS THAT GENSCHER WAS OF THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG FOR THE WESTERN SIDE TO APPROACH THE MIDDLE EAST ISSUE WITHOUT A SENSE OF URGENCY. HE FELT THAT THERE WOULD BE A DANGER OF SLIPPAGE TOWARD EXTREMISM ON THE PART OF THE PALESTINIANS, IF A RELAXED APPROACH SEEMED TO BE THE WESTERN STANCE.

5. MBFR. VON STADEN SAID THAT GENSCHER HAD READ WITH INTEREST THE SECRETARY'S FEBRUARY 3RD PRESS CONFERENCE AND PARTICULARLY HIS REMARKS ON MBFR. HE HAD FOCUSED ON THE SECRETARY'S DESIRE TO GET THE VIENNA TALKS OUT OF THE DOLDRUMS. VON STADEN NOTED THAT THE US AND THE FRG HAD BEEN FREQUENTLY IN CONTACT IN THE PAST, IN A BILATERAL MANNER, AND GENSCHER NOW WISHED TO RESUME THIS SORT OF CONTACT. THE GERMAN SIDE WOULD APPRECIATE IT IF IT COULD BE IN EARLY TOUCH WITH THE US ON MBFR MATTERS. GENSCHER THEREFORE PROPOSED, IF THIS WERE ACCEPTABLE TO THE SECRETARY, THAT THE GERMANS SEND THEIR REPRESENTATIVE, ROTH, TO WASHINGTON IN EARLY MARCH FOR TALKS. THESE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE KEPT CONFIDENTIAL. VON STADEN STRESSED THE DELICACY OF HAVING QUIET US-FRG BILATERALS ON AN ISSUE OF CONCERN TO THE ENTIRE

ALLIANCE, BUT STATED THAT THE GERMAN SIDE FELT THIS WAS NECESSARY BECAUSE OF THE FRG'S IMPORTANT ROLE IN VIENNA.

SECRET

6. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT HE THOUGHT EARLY MARCH WOULD BE A GOOD TIME SINCE OUR REVIEW OF MBFR OUGHT TO BE COMPLETED BY THAT TIME, AND THAT THE US SIDE WOULD WELCOME AMBASSADOR ROTH'S VISIT. HE ADDED THAT THE US, OF COURSE, HAD NO INTENTION OF DOING ANYTHING IN THE MBFR CONTEXT WITHOUT FULL CONSULTATION IN ADVANCE WITH THE ALLIES, AND ESPECIALLY WITH THE FRG. VON STADEN SAID THAT THE GERMAN SIDE HAD NEVER DOUBTED THIS FACT.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 030351

7. VON STADEN NOTED THAT IN THE SECRETARY'S PRESS CONFERENCE, THE SECRETARY HAD REFERRED TO THE COSTLINESS OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IN THE PAST THE ALLIANCE HAD LIMITED MBFR LARGELY TO MANPOWER REDUCTIONS, APART FROM THE OPTION THREE PROPOSAL. HE ASKED WHETHER WE WERE NOW CONSIDERING LIMITATIONS ON WEAPONS SYSTEMS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAD BEEN REFERRING IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE TO THE MATTER OF ARMS SALES, AND HAD BEEN SPEAKING IN A LARGE SENSE ABOUT THE DANGER OF ARMS SALES IN PARTICULAR AREAS OF THE WORLD, E.G. THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA. HE THEREFORE THOUGHT THAT THE ENTIRE AREA OF ARMS SALES SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF DISCUSSION BETWEEN THE US AND ITS ALLIES, AND NOT ONLY BETWEEN THE US AND THE BUYING NATIONS. HE NOTED THAT THE US, AS THE LARGEST SUPPLIER, HAD THE LARGEST RESPONSIBILITY TO CONSULT IN THIS AREA, AND ADDED THAT

WHAT THE US WAS NOW LOOKING FOR WAS A SENSIBLE POLICY ON THE SALE OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS. VON STADEN COMMENTED THAT THE FRG ALREADY HAD A VERY RESTRICTIVE POLICY IN THIS REGARD. HE SAID THAT GERMANY DID NOT EXPORT CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS OUTSIDE THE NATO AREA, EXCEPT IN THE MOST UNUSUAL CASES. HE ADDED THAT THE FRG HAD A PROBLEM, HOWEVER, WITH REGARD TO CO-PRODUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, ESPECIALLY WITH FRANCE. HE SAID FRANCE OFTEN WISHED TO EXPORT WEAPONS, IN THE PRODUCTION OF WHICH THE FRG HAD COOPERATED. HE CONCLUDED BY NOTING THAT IF THE US WAS TO DISCUSS AN ARMS SALES POLICY WITH THE ALLIES, THEREFORE, IT WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE FRANCE. HE SAID THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT HAD DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE WITH VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE DURING THE LATTER'S RECENT VISIT TO BONN. SECRETARY VANCE EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH THIS VIEWPOINT, AND SAID THAT THE US ALSO WISHED TO COORDINATE ITS THINKING WITH

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 030351

THE UK IN THIS CONNECTION. HE ADDED THAT THE US HAD ALREADY RAISED THE MATTER WITH THE SOVIETS, SINCE THEY

SECRET

WERE ACTIVE IN SELLING ARMS TO SENSITIVE AREAS. VON STADEN SAID THAT HE DOUBTED IT WOULD BE EASY TO GET AN AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS, SINCE THEIR POLICY SEEMED TO BE TO AVOID GRANTING DEVELOPMENT AID TO THE THIRD WORLD, BUT RATHER TO CHOOSE COUNTRIES WITH POPULAR CAUSES AND DELIVER ARMS TO THEM. THE SECRETARY SAID HE DID NOT UNDERESTIMATE THE DIFFICULTY OF THE PROBLEM WITH THE SOVIETS, BUT THAT HE CONSIDERED THEIR POSITION UNACCEPTABLE.

8. CIEC/ECONOMIC SUMMIT. VON STADEN SAID THAT GENSCHER HAD ASKED HIM TO RAISE THE MATTER OF THE TIMING OF THE CIEC MINISTERIAL AND THE ECONOMIC SUMMIT. THE GERMANS AND FRENCH HAD RECENTLY HAD TOP-LEVEL TALKS IN PARIS, AND HAD COME TO THE CONCLUSION, ONE WHICH VON STADEN THOUGHT WAS SHARED BY THE BRITISH, THAT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO HAVE THE SUMMIT BEFORE THE CIEC MINISTERIAL, AND IN FACT TO PREPARE FOR THE CIEC MEETING AT THE SUMMIT. THE GERMANS AND FRENCH WERE NOW OF THE VIEW THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO HOLD THE SUMMIT ON OR ABOUT MAY 8, I.E. JUST BEFORE THE NATO MINISTERIAL. THEY FELT THAT A POST-CIEC SUMMIT COULD LEAD THE LDC'S TO EXPECT A CHANGE IN THE WESTERN POSITION AND TO PRESS FOR A SECOND MINISTERIAL WERE THEY TO BE DISAPPOINTED WITH THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT ONE COULD OF COURSE USE THE REVERSE ARGUMENT, BUT SAID THAT THE US WOULD NONETHELESS TAKE THE VIEW EXPRESSED BY THE GERMAN SIDE INTO ACCOUNT IN CONSIDERING THE TIMING OF THE MEETINGS. HE SAID THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS SUBJECT WITH THE PRESIDENT THE NIGHT BEFORE. HE HAD DESCRIBED THE POSITIONS OF THE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 030351

VARIOUS COUNTRIES ON TIMING, BUT HAD THOUGHT THERE WAS A DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE FRENCH AND WEST GERMANY. VON STADEN CONCEDED THIS HAD BEEN TRUE, BUT THAT THE GERMAN AND FRENCH POSITIONS HAD BEEN BROUGHT TOGETHER THROUGH THE BILATERALS IN PARIS LAST WEEK.

9. VON STADEN SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE US SIDE WAS STILL IN THE PROCESS OF WORKING UP ITS POSITION

FOR CIEC. HE SAID THAT THE GERMANS NONETHELESS WOULD BE INTERESTED IN AN EARLY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON IT WITH THE US. THE FRG FELT THAT THE WEST SHOULD COME UP WITH A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL WHICH, WHILE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE VIEWS OF THE LDCS, WOULD PLACE MOST EMPHASIS ON THE TRANSFER OF RESOURCES, AND ON SOME SOLUTION TO THE DEBT PROBLEM, AND LESS EMPHASIS ON THE COMMODITIES ISSUE. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT THIS TOO WAS THE VIEW AT THE STAFF LEVEL ON THE US SIDE, AND HE

AGREED THAT WE SHOULD HOLD EARLY CONSULTATIONS ON THE ENTIRE SUBJECT.

10. CYPRUS. VON STADEN SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN ASKED TO STRESS HOW MUCH THE FRG GOVERNMENT WELCOMED THE APPOINTMENT OF CLARK CLIFFORD TO THE MISSION ON CYPRUS.

GENSCHER HOPED THAT THE EC-9 WOULD BE INFORMED OF THE RESULTS OF MR. CLIFFORD'S FORTHCOMING TRIP. THE SECRETARY SAID THAT CLIFFORD WOULD BE PREPARED TO DO SO ON COMPLETION OF HIS VISIT TO THE AREA. HE ADDED THAT EITHER THROUGH VON STADEN OR OUR EMBASSY IN BONN, HE TOO WOULD BE IN TOUCH WITH MINISTER GENSCHER AFTER HIS MIDDLE EAST TRIP TO REPORT HIS FINDINGS.

11. NON PROLIFERATION. THE SECRETARY STRESSED HIS SATISFACTION WITH THE FACT THAT THE US AND FRG WOULD DISCUSS THE FRG-BRAZILIAN AGREEMENT TOMORROW.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 030351

HE EXPRESSED HIS STRONG BACKING FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER AND HIS ROLE IN THE TALKS. VON STADEN STRESSED ONLY THE FULL SUPPORT WHICH THE CHANCELLOR WOULD HAVE FROM ALL ELEMENTS OF THE GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION ON THE FULFILLMENT OF THE GERMAN AGREEMENT WITH BRAZIL. HE WARNED THAT THE CHANCELLOR COULD NOT IGNORE PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EFFORT TO MEET US OBJECTIONS TO THAT AGREEMENT.

12. SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS DISTRESSED WITH THE RECENT ACTIONS OF IAN SMITH. HE COULD NOT STRESS TOO STRONGLY HOW IMPORTANT IT WAS TO GET THE VARIOUS PARTIES BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE IN GENEVA. HE TOLD VON STADEN THAT HE WOULD BE TESTIFYING TOMORROW ON THE HILL IN FAVOR OF A REPEAL OF THE BYRD AMENDMENT. HE CONSIDERED THIS SHOULD BE OF GREAT SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE, REPRESENTING THE DEEPLY HELD COMMITMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION, WHICH INTENDED TO PUT ITS FULL STRENGTH BEHIND THE REPEAL EFFORT. HE HOPED THAT SMITH WOULD UNDERSTAND THE MESSAGE THAT WAS BEING TRANSMITTED THEREBY. HE ASKED VON STADEN WHAT THE

GERMAN VIEWS WERE ON HOW TO GET SOME FORWARD MOVEMENT ON THE NAMIBIA PROBLEM. VON STADEN SAID HE COULD NOT ANSWER THIS SINCE HE HAD NOT A SUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE OF THE SUBJECT. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD ENQUIRE IN BONN AND BE IN TOUCH WITH ASSISTANT SECRETARY SCHAUFELE AS SOON AS HE HAD SOMETHING. HE ADDED THAT THE FRG HAD ALWAYS STRESSED ITS ROLE WITHIN THE EC-9 WITH REGARD TO NAMIBIA. THE SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD

THIS AND THAT HE WOULD BE TALKING TO THE NINE ON THE MATTER, BUT THAT HE NEEDED THE BEST THINKING OF EVERYONE INVOLVED TO GET THINGS MOVING FORWARD, OTHERWISE

HE FEARED THE SITUATION WOULD SLIP BACKWARD.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 08 STATE 030351

13. VISITORS. VON STADEN SAID THAT SPD FIGURE HORST EHMKE, WHO HAD MET WITH MR. VANCE IN NOVEMBER OF LAST YEAR, WOULD BE VISITING WASHINGTON MARCH 7 AND 8. EHMKE HOPED TO SEE THE SECRETARY SOMETIME DURING HIS VISIT. SECRETARY VANCE SAID HE WOULD BE GLAD TO SEE HIM. FOLLOWING A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE SUCCESS AND IMPORTANCE OF VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE'S TRIP TO BONN AND BERLIN, VON STADEN SAID THAT HE HOPED THE CHANCELLOR WOULD BE ABLE TO VISIT WASHINGTON SOON, AND SAID THERE HAD BEEN SOME THOUGHT GIVEN TO HIS COMING AFTER HIS VISIT TO OTTAWA.

VANCE

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 22-Sep-1999 12:00:00 am  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** MEETINGS  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Sent Date:** 10-Feb-1977 12:00:00 am  
**Decaption Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 22 May 2009  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1977STATE030351  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** EUR/CE:DANDERSON:SLU  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Expiration:**  
**Film Number:** D770048-0401  
**Format:** TEL  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:**  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1977/newtext/t197702100/baaaevfy.tel  
**Line Count:** 307  
**Litigation Code IDs:**  
**Litigation Codes:**  
**Litigation History:**  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM  
**Message ID:** 054d1fbf-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Office:** ORIGIN SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 6  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** EXDIS  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Retention:** 0  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 18-Nov-2004 12:00:00 am  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**SAS ID:** 3233656  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** FRG AMBASSADOR'S CALL ON THE SECRETARY  
**TAGS:** PFOR, MNUC, GE, XF, SF, US, (VANCE, CYRUS R), (VON STADEN, BERNDT)  
**To:** BONN INFO LONDON MULTIPLE  
**Type:** TE  
**vdkgvwkey:** odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/054d1fbf-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc  
**Review Markings:**  
Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
22 May 2009  
**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009